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 Abstract
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim rationalizability, and shows that all
type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim rationaliz-
able outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common knowledge of rationality in the
universal type space. JEL Classi￿cation and keywords: C70,C72, rationalizability, incomplete
information, common knowledge, universal type space.
1 Introduction
Harsanyi (1967-8) proposes solving games of incomplete information using type spaces, and
Mertens and Zamir (1985) show how to construct a universal type space, into which all other
type spaces (satisfying certain technical regularity assumptions) can be mapped.1 The universal
type space is the set of all in￿nite hierarchies of beliefs satisfying common knowledge of coherency.
However, Bergemann and Morris (2001, section 2.2.2) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) em-
phasize that type spaces may allow for more correlation than is captured in the belief hierarchies,
so identifying types that have identical hierarchies may lead to a loss of information, and solution
concepts can di⁄er when applied to two di⁄erent type spaces even if they are mapped into the same
subset of the universal type space. This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated
rationalizability, and in Proposition 2 shows that all type spaces that have the same hierarchies
of beliefs have the same set of interim correlated rationalizable outcomes. Thus this is a solution
concept which can be characterized by working with the universal type space, and more generally
permits identifying those type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs.
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) showed that the set of actions that survive iterated deletion
of strictly dominated strategies in a complete information game is equal to the set of actions that
could be played in a subjective correlated equilibrium. Our second result, proposition 3, reports
a straightforward extension of Brandenburger and Dekel￿ s observation to games with incomplete
information; this shows that interim rationalizability characterizes common knowledge of rational-
izability.
We now sketch the main constructs in the paper. Fix a type space, where players have beliefs
and higher order beliefs about some payo⁄ relevant state space ￿. A game consists of payo⁄
functions mapping from action pro￿les and ￿ to the real line. We discuss two de￿nitions of interim
rationalizability. To ￿nd the set of independently interim rationalizable strategies, iteratively delete
for each type all actions that are not best responses given that type￿ s beliefs over others￿types and ￿
1Further details and references are provided in the next section.
iand given any pro￿le of strategies of all other players, where under those strategies, each type puts
positive probability only on surviving actions. The set of (correlated) interim rationalizable actions
results from iteratively deleting for each type all actions that are not best responses given that type￿ s
beliefs over others￿types and ￿ and given any (perhaps correlated) conditional beliefs about which
surviving actions are played by at a given type pro￿le and payo⁄ relevant state. In this de￿nition,
a player￿ s beliefs allow for correlation between one player￿ s actions and the payo⁄ state and other
players￿actions. In the complete information case (i.e., when ￿ is a singleton), these de￿nitions
reduce to the standard de￿nitions of independent and (correlated) rationalizability, respectively
(e.g., as in Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)). In the complete-information case, independent and
correlated rationalizability are equivalent when there are two players but not necessarily with three
or more players. We will see that with incomplete information, they may di⁄er even in the two-
person case (because of the possible correlation in a player￿ s conjecture between the opponent￿ s
actions and the payo⁄-relevant state).
Our contribution in this paper is to clarify and slightly extend existing work. We use the
concept of interim rationalizability discussed in this paper in our ongoing work on de￿ning strategic
topologies on the universal type space (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2004)).2 For this exercise,
it is important for us to know that the solution concept depends only on hierarchies of beliefs and
not on "redundant" elements of the type space. Another contribution of this note is to identify and
analyze the distinction between independent and correlated interim rationalizability.
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) de￿ne an umbrella notion of "￿-rationalizable" actions in
incomplete information environments, where ￿ can be varied to capture common-knowledge re-
strictions on the ￿rst order of beliefs in the hierarchy. They show that there is an equivalence
between actions surviving an iterative procedure capturing common knowledge of ￿ and the set
of actions that might be played in equilibrium on any type space where ￿ is common knowledge.
(Correlated) interim rationalizable actions are exactly ￿-rationalizable actions, where we let ￿
consist of a complete description of the in￿nite hierarchies of beliefs. With this ￿, proposition 3
below corresponds to their proposition 4.3; they do not discuss explicitly mention either correlated
or independent interim rationalizability.3
Forges (1993) explores the related question of how to de￿ne correlated equilibrium for games
of incomplete information. Forges allows correlating devices that enable a player￿ s own actions to
2For this purpose, we also verify below that all the results extend to "-rationalizability and "-equilibrium.
3As their analysis deals with restrictions on ￿rst order beliefs, our result corresponds to an extension of their
approach to allow for restrictions on the entire hierarchy of beliefs.
iidepend on the payo⁄ states ￿ even when the player cannot distinguish between the states; as we
discuss at the end of subsection 3.4 this is similar to what we do. Furthermore, like Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (2003), Forges studies the solution concept corresponding to allowing the type space to
vary over all spaces (with a common prior). Forges￿proposition 3, that relates common knowledge
of rationality (with a common prior and a given type space) to agent-normal form correlated
equilibrium is analogous to our remark 1 in which we reinterpret proposition 3 as implying that
common knowledge of rationality corresponds to interim (correlated) rationalizability.
Weinstein and Yildiz (2003) prove that under additional assumptions (generic payo⁄s and a
richness condition on the payo⁄uncertainty) the conclusion of our proposition 3 can be strengthened
in certain directions. Pick any type ti in the universal type space, and any equilibrium s of a game
played on the universal type space, and any action ai that is interim rationalizable for ti. Then for
any k, there is a type t0
i that agrees with ti up to the ￿rst k steps in the hierarchy and such that
si (ti) = ai. This result would follow from our Propsotion 3, if one were to add redundant types to
the universal type space and to pick the equilibrium on the enlarged type space. But Weinstein
and Yildiz show that￿ under their additional assumptions￿ any equilibrium on the universal type
space itself already contains enough richness for the conclusion.
A recent paper by Ely and Peski (2004) also notes that the set of independent interim rational-
izable outcomes depend on more than just the standard universal type space. They characterize
how the standard universal type space must be expanded to deal with this issue. Thus, while we
￿nd the solution concept which depends on types only via their (standard) hierarchies of beliefs,
Ely and Peski provide an extended notion of hierarchies of beliefs for which a di⁄erent solution
concept depends on types only via those extended hierarchies.
2 Type Spaces
We base our development of type spaces on Heifetz and Samet￿ s (1998) topology-free con-
struction. The primitive of the model is a measurable set of states of Nature, ￿, a ￿nite set
of players, I, and a type space T = (Ti;b ￿i)
I
i=1, where each Ti is a measurable space and each
b ￿i : Ti ! ￿(T￿i ￿ ￿), where for measurable X we denote by ￿(X) the set of (probability) mea-
sures on X, and T￿i ￿ ￿ is endowed with the product ￿-algebra. Points ti 2 Ti are called player
i0s types, and we say that each type ti of player i has belief b ￿i (ti) about the joint distribution of
the opponent￿ s type and the state of Nature.
The set of measures, ￿(X), is endowed with the ￿-￿eld generated by
ff￿ : ￿(E) ￿ pg : p 2 [0;1] and E ￿ Xg:
iii(Throughout, when writing E ￿ X for a measurable space X we consider only measurable subsets,
and all functions are measurable; we do not specify this restriction again.)4
A type space can be translated into another type space if it can be mapped into that space
while preserving the belief structure. Formally, (Ti;￿i) is translated into
￿
~ Ti; ~ ￿i
￿
if for each i there








for F ￿ ￿ ￿ ~ T￿i.
A particular type space is Harsanyi￿ s "universal type space," as constructed by Mertens and
Zamir (1985).5 Speci￿cally, let X0 = ￿, and de￿ne Xk = Xk￿1 ￿ [￿(Xk￿1)]
I￿1, where ￿(Xk) is
the set of probability measures on the Borel ￿eld B(Xk) of Xk, endowed with the "weak" topology,
and each Xk is given the product topology over its two components. An element (￿1;￿2;:::) 2 Ti ,
￿1
k=0￿(Xk) is called a hierarchy (of beliefs).
For the topology-free model we describe here, Heifetz and Samet (1998) prove the existence
of a universal type space comprised of a subset of hierarchies, T￿








, for all i. The type space is universal in that any other type space can be uniquely
translated into this universal type space. Speci￿cally for any hierarchy t 2 T￿, we write ￿k (t)
for the kth component of t and we write T￿
k for the set of kth level beliefs for all types in T￿ ,
T￿
k ￿ ￿(Xk￿1). (Where no confusion results we drop the subscript of i for notational simplicity.)
Type t￿ s marginal beliefs about the state of Nature are
b ￿1
i [ti](￿) = ^ ￿i [ti](f(t￿i;￿) : t￿i 2 T￿ig).
More generally, for each k = 2;3:::, the translation implies the existence of b ￿k








i [ti](E) = b ￿i [ti]
￿n















, and then b ￿￿
i : Ti ! T￿
i is the translation discussed above.
2.1 Examples of ￿Redundant￿Types
A player￿ s type captures everything about his beliefs and higher order beliefs about ￿. However,
type spaces also contain types that cannot be distinguished on the basis of their beliefs and higher
order beliefs about ￿. While Mertens and Zamir (1985) labelled these ￿redundant types￿ , they
may nonetheless be strategically relevant. This issue, and its signi￿cance for the interpretation of
4Note that if X is Polish then this belief-generated ￿eld corresponds to the Borel ￿eld when X is endowed with
the topology of weak convergence of measures (i.e. the "weak" topology) Thus we also use ￿(X) to denote the Borel
￿eld when it is equivalent.
5See also Armbruster and Boge (1979), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), and Heifetz (1993), among others.
ivthe universal type space, has been discussed by Bergemann and Morris (2001) and Battigalli and













= b ￿i (ti).
As noted by the above authors, this is most easy to see in the case of complete information, where
￿ is a singleton.
Example 1 Let I = 2, T1 = ft1;t0
1;t00
1g, T2 = ft2;t0
2;t00
2g and ￿ = f￿g. Let beliefs be generated by
















1 0 0 1
2
Now (for each i) b ￿￿
i (t00
i ) = b ￿￿
i (t0
i) = b ￿￿
i (ti) but b ￿i (t0
i) 6= b ￿i (ti), b ￿i (t00
i ) 6= b ￿i (ti) and b ￿i (t00
i ) 6= b ￿i (t0
i).
We will see that in de￿ning rationalizability, this particular type of redundancy is relatively
easy to deal with. But the redundancy in the following type space turns out to be trickier.
Example 2 Let I = 2, T1 = ft1;t0
1;t00
1g, T2 = ft2;t0
2;t00
2g and ￿ =
￿
￿;￿0￿
. Let beliefs be generated

































1 0 0 1
4
Again (for each i) b ￿￿
i (t00
i ) = b ￿￿
i (t0
i) = b ￿￿
i (ti) but b ￿i (t0
i) 6= b ￿i (ti), b ￿i (t00




3 Games and solution concepts
Each player has a measure space of possible actions Ai. A game g consists of, for each player,
a payo⁄ function gi, where gi : A￿￿ ! [0;1]. Write G for the set of possible games. The solution
concepts we study are applied to a pair (g;T ), and specify possible action pro￿les for such a game




vOur main solution concept is " (correlated) interim rationalizability, where " is a measure of
sub-optimization. To clarify the role of correlation we also provide a de￿nition of independent
interim rationalizability. We also de￿ne other solution concepts and equivalencies among them in
a manner that is analogous to what is known for the case of complete information (i.e., ￿ being a
singleton).
We begin with a ￿xed-point de￿nition of the solution concepts, because in the general environ-
ment we allow the usual iterative process may require trans￿nite induction; see Lipman (1994). We
then prove that when A and ￿ are ￿nite this ￿xed point corresponds to de￿nition using a standard
iteration procedure. The section ends with examples studying how these concepts may depend on
(more than) just the hierarchy of beliefs in a type space. Throughout we hold the game g and the
number " ￿xed; hence to simplify notation and terminology we do not explicitly write that various
functions depend on these parameters, e.g. the phrase "best reply" will mean a reply that gives
within " of the maximum payo⁄. The main question is whether the solution depends on the type
space, so we do specify the dependence on T .
3.1 Best replies and undominated actions
For any subset of actions for all types , we ￿rst de￿ne the interim rationalizable actions when
beliefs over opponents are restricted to those actions.
De￿nition 1 The correspondence of best replies for all types given a subset of actions for all


















, with non-empty Etj ￿ Atj for all tj and j 6= i, we de￿ne the " best replies
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9￿ 2 ￿(T￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj) such that
(i) ￿
￿￿
(t￿i;￿;a￿i) : atj 2 Etj for all j 6= i
￿￿
= 1









d￿ ￿ ￿" for all a0
i 2 Ai
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
(1)

















To de￿ne the independent interim best replies we append to the conditions de￿ning BR the fol-








F ￿j6=i￿j (aj)d^ ￿i (t￿i;￿).
6We absue notation and write BR both for the corresondence specifying best replies for a type and for the
corresondence specifying these actions for all types.
viWe denote this function and the resulting ￿xed point by adding the pre￿x I, thus the best reply
correspondence is denoted IBRT .
Condition (iv) implies condition (ii), by adding up over all a￿i, but we state it separately to
facilitate providing (and comparing with) the main de￿nition that follows. Note that (iv) embodies
two forms of independence: beliefs over opponents￿actions are determined by multiplying them,
and opponents￿actions are independent of ￿ conditional on their type.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, page 226) demonstrate the important distinction between interim
and ex ante (strictly) dominated strategies. By the standard duality argument showing the equiva-
lence of strict domination and never best response, we can de￿ne a correspondence of undominated
strategies that is equivalent to BRT .







, with non-empty Etj ￿ Atj for all tj and j 6= i, the "
interim undominated actions for ti in game g are UT
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There does not exist ￿i 2 ￿(Ai) such that,















5 c d￿i [ti] > "
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;











is de￿ned analogously to BRT ,
and the equivalence UT
i = BRT
i follows from standard arguments.
3.2 Fixed-point de￿nitions
De￿nition 2 The set of interim rationalizable actions (for all types) is the largest ￿xed point of











i2I ( BRT is a decreasing function
on a complete lattice, so the largest ￿xed point exists)
We can similarly de￿ne the equivalent ￿xed point of undominated actions, UT = RT . The
pro￿le of independent interim rationalizable actions is analogously the largest ￿xed point of the









We will want to use another alternative characterization of the interim rationalizable actions.
Let ST
i : Ti ! 2Ai￿







De￿nition 3 ST is a best-reply set if for each ti and ai 2 ST




(t￿i;￿;a￿i) : aj 2 ST
j (tj) for each j 6= i
oi
= 1









d￿ ￿ ￿" for all a0
i 2 Ai
The following two properties are now immediate from the de￿nitions.
Lemma 1 RT is a best reply set.
Lemma 2 If ST is a best reply set, then ST
i (ti) ￿ RT
i (ti) for all i and ti.
3.3 Iterative de￿nitions
If the action and nature spaces, A ￿ ￿, are ￿nite, then instead of using a ￿xed point argument
we could apply BRT (or UT ) iteratively. That is, let RT
1 = BRT (A), and RT








k . Under such ￿niteness assumptions RT = RT
1. That this is true if T is ￿nite is
immediate.7 But we now argue why it holds true of arbitrary T . The key to the argument is
that, regardless of the nature of the type space, the set ￿(A￿i ￿ ￿) is a ￿nite-dimensional metric
space, and it is elements of this set that determine payo⁄s and best replies.
Proposition 1 If A ￿ ￿ is ￿nite, then RT = RT
1.
PROOF: We claim that RT
1 is a best-reply set, and therefore that the iterative process and ￿xed-
point de￿nition coincide. That nothing larger can be a best-reply set is immediate; the only
question is whether after the taking the limit of the iterative procedure, further actions could be







i ￿ ￿(A￿i ￿ ￿) be the set of beliefs over A￿i ￿ ￿ consistent with RT




> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
  2 ￿(A￿i ￿ ￿) :
  =
R
T￿i ￿ (t￿i;￿;a￿i)dt￿i for some ￿ 2 ￿(T￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj) s.t.
(i) ￿
￿￿
(t￿i;￿;a￿i) : atj 2 RT
j;k (tj) for all j 6= i
￿￿
= 1









d￿ ￿ ￿" for all a0
i 2 Ai
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
.
7We conjecture it also holds for type spaces (T;￿) where T , ￿ and A are topological spaces, and where g is
continuous and ￿ is continuous and maps into regular measures on ￿(￿ ￿ T￿i).






does not exist   2 ￿1
i such that ai is a best reply for ti against  . That is, for each   2 ￿1
i there
exists a0
i 2 Ai s.t.
R
(￿;a￿i)
[gi (ai;a￿i;￿) ￿ gi (a0
i;a￿i;￿)]d  < ￿".




[gi (ai;a￿i;￿) ￿ gi (￿i;a￿i;￿)]d  < ￿" for all   2 ￿1
i . By continuity of expected utility
there is a neighborhood of   such that this remains true. And because ￿(A￿i ￿ ￿) is a compact
metric space, and the ￿k
i are a decreasing sequence of subsets converging to ￿1




[gi (ai;a￿i;￿) ￿ gi (￿i;a￿i;￿)]d  ￿ ￿" for all   2 ￿k
i . Hence ai = 2 RT
k (ti), leading
to a contradiction. ￿
3.4 Examples
In example 1, we clearly have IRT 1
i (ti) = IRT 1
i (t0
i) = IRT 1
i (t00
i ) and RT 1





i ) for any two-player game g. In particular, these sets will be the "-rationalizable actions
of the underlying complete-information game and the result is an implication of the equivalence of
correlated and independent rationalizability in two-player complete-information games.
But in the type space of example 2, things wont be so simple, even in two-player games. Consider











Let " = 0. Now IRT 2
2 (t2) = IRT 2
2 (t0
2) = IRT 2
2 (t00
2) = fL;Rg; and IRT 2
1 (t1) = IRT 2
1 (t0
1) =
fu;dg, but IRT 2
1 (t00
1) = fdg. However, RT 2
2 (t2) = RT 2
2 (t0
2) = RT 2
2 (t00




1) = RT 2
1 (t00
1) = fu;dg. To see why u 2 RT 2
1 (t00
1), let type t00










This example has the same ￿ avor as examples showing the non-equivalence of correlated and
interim rationalizability in three-player complete-information games. For example, consider the
three-player game where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column and player 3 chooses











ixHere, action d fails to be independently rationalizable for player 1 but is correlated rationalizable.
In an in￿ uential argument, Aumann (1987) writes in this context that
...in games with more than two players, correlation may express the fact that what 3,
say, thinks that 1 will do may depend on what he thinks 2 will do. This is no connection
with any overt or even covert collusion between 1 and 2; they may be acting entirely
independently....(page 612)
We propose treating nature as another player. If player 1, say, does not know what determines
which of his rationalizable actions player 2 will play, why should this subjective uncertainty be com-
pletely independent of the uncertainty about the choice of nature? This interpretation introduces
the possibility that there are other (payo⁄ irrelevant) states of the world that are not modelled in
￿ but that lead to these beliefs. We explicitly exploit such an expansion of the space in Section 5
to prove the equivalence of interim rationalizability with more familiar solution concepts.
4 Measurability of Interim Rationalizable Sets
In the last example, the set of independent interim rationalizable actions depended not only on
a type￿ s beliefs and higher order beliefs about ￿, but also on the type space within which that type
was embedded. But the set of interim rationalizable actions depended only on a type￿ s beliefs and
higher-order beliefs about ￿. The following proposition shows that this is true in general.
Proposition 2 Given two type spaces on the basic set of states ￿, T and T , with ti a type of i in
T and t0
i a type of i in T 0, we have b ￿￿
i (t0
i) = b ￿￿





PROOF: (i)We will prove this using the "-best-reply sets. Speci￿cally, consider a best-reply set ST ,
and recall the translation of T into hierarchies of beliefs discussed in section 2, ^ ￿￿ : T ! T￿. The
claim is that if we replace all types by their image in the universal type space we still obtain a best-
reply set. That is, map ti into t￿
i = ^ ￿￿










For any ￿ 2 ￿(T￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ A￿i) de￿ne ￿￿ 2 ￿
￿
T￿
￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ A￿i
￿
by
￿￿ (E ￿ f￿g ￿ fag) = ￿
￿
(^ ￿￿)
￿1 (E) ￿ f￿g ￿ fag
￿
for E ￿ T￿
￿i. It is immediate that conditions (i)￿ (iii) in the de￿nition of best-reply sets are
satis￿ed. Thus we have shown that for any type space T and any type ti of i in that space,
xS (ti) ￿ S (^ ￿￿ (ti)). The converse is obtained similarly. For any ￿￿ 2 ￿
￿
T￿
￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ A￿i
￿
de￿ne
￿ 2 ￿(T￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ A￿i) by
￿ (E ￿ f￿g ￿ fag) = ￿￿ (^ ￿￿ (E) ￿ f￿g ￿ fag)
for E ￿ T￿i. Again (i)￿ (iii) are immediate. Therefore S (ti) = S (^ ￿￿ (ti)). ￿
Claim: One can also show that b ￿k
i (t0
i) = b ￿k
i (ti) ) RT 0
i;k (t0
i) = RT
i;k (ti) for any ￿nite k: We will
provide a proof in a future version of this paper.
5 Interim Rationalizability, Equilibrium on Large Type Spaces
and Common Knowledge of Rationality
One message from Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) was that equilibrium has no bite when there
are large type spaces and the common prior assumption is dropped. We can state the analogous
result for this incomplete information setting. Speci￿cally, we prove that given any type space
and game, any interim rationalizable action is also played in an equilibrium of that same game
but with an expanded type space. Brandenburger and Dekel prove that any rationalizable action
of a complete information game is played in some subjective correlated equilibrium, which is just
an equilibrium of a game with an expanded type space that functions as a subjective correlating
device. Our construction below is very similar, we expand the type spaces by adding to each player￿ s
type a signal that corresponds to a recommended action.
Fix type space T . We will consider an enlarged type space (e T =
￿
~ Ti; ~ ￿i
￿I
i=1
) which can be
translated into T (with translation ’i : e Ti ! Ti). Given a g and the type space e T , we have an
incomplete information game. A strategy pro￿le s = (s1;:::;sI), each si : e Ti ! Ai, measurable, is







































for all i, e ti 2 e Ti and ai 2 Ai.
Proposition 3 ￿ ai 2 RT
i (￿ ti) if and only if there exists an enlarged type space e T and an "-interim












= ￿ ti for some e ti 2 e Ti.
xiPROOF. For each ai 2 RT (ti), by Lemma 1, there exists ￿ai;ti 2 ￿(T￿i ￿ ￿ ￿ A￿i) such that
￿ai;ti
￿￿
(t￿i;￿;a￿i) : aj 2 RT (tj) for all j 6= i
￿￿
= 1,









d￿ai;ti ￿ ￿" for all a0
i 2 Ai. (2)
Now consider the following enlarged type space with
~ Ti = Ti ￿ Ai
e ￿i (￿j(ti;ai)) = ￿ai;ti;
’i ((ti;ai)) = ti.
Consider the strategy pro￿le with
si ((ti;ai)) = ai.






























































































= ￿ ti for some e ti 2 Ti. Since S satis￿es the "￿best response property
for game g, we have by Lemma 2 that ￿ ai 2 Si (￿ ti) ￿ RT
i (￿ ti). ￿
xiiRemark 1 Following Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) we can reinterpret proposition 2 as es-
tablishing that the set of interim rationalizable actions for type ti are the set of actions that are
consistent with common knowledge of rationality (while maintaining the implicit assumption that
there is common knowledge of the game g and type ti￿ s beliefs and higher order beliefs about ￿).
Similarly we can follow Aumann (1987), Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Tan and Werlang
(1988) and view proposition 3 as relating common knowledge of rationality to a solution concept.
Speci￿cally, suppose we interpret the function si : ~ Ti ! Ai on the enlarged state space as represent-
ing the action which is played as a function of a player￿ s type. If we ￿x the game g, we can de￿ne




















































Common knowledge of rationality holds only on a belief-closed space contained in [Rati (g;")] for all
i. Thus Proposition 3 establishes that common knowledge of rationality implies that players choose
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